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Per capita income in the richest countries of the world exceeds that in the poorest countries by more
than a factor of 50. What explains these enormous differences? This paper returns to several old ideas
in development economics and proposes that linkages, complementarity, and superstar effects are
at the heart of the explanation. First, linkages between firms through intermediate goods deliver a multiplier
similar to the one associated with capital accumulation in a neoclassical growth model. Because the
intermediate goods' share of revenue is about 1/2, this multiplier is substantial. Second, just as a chain
is only as strong as its weakest link, problems at any point in a production chain can reduce output
substantially if inputs enter production in a complementary fashion. Finally, the high elasticity of substitution
associated with final consumption delivers a superstar effect: GDP depends disproportionately on
the highest levels of productivity in the economy. This paper builds a model with links across sectors,
complementary inputs, and highly substitutable consumption, and shows that it can easily generate
50-fold aggregate income differences.
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1. INTRODUCTION
By the end of the 20th century, per capita income in the United States was
more than 50 times higher than per capita income in Ethiopia and Tanzania.
Dispersion across the 95th-5th percentiles of countries was more than a factor
of 32. What explains these profound differences in incomes across countries?1
This paper returns to several old ideas in the development economics litera-
ture and proposes that linkages, complementarity, and superstar effects are at
the heart of the explanation. Intermediate goods provide links between sectors
that create a productivity multiplier. Low productivity in electric power gen-
eration reduces output in banking and construction. But this reduces the ease
with which the electricity industry can build new dams and therefore further
reduces output in electric power generation. This multiplier effect is similar
to the multiplier associated with capital accumulation in a neoclassical growth
model. In fact, intermediate goods are just another form of capital, albeit one
that depreciates fully in production. Because the intermediate goods’ share of
revenue is approximately 1/2, the intermediate goods multiplier is large.
Because of complementarity, high productivity in a ﬁrm requires a high level
of performance along a large number of dimensions. Textile producers require
rawmaterials, knittingmachines, ahealthyandtrainedlaborforce, knowledgeof
how to produce, security, business licenses, transportation networks, electricity,
etc. These inputs enter in a complementary fashion, in the sense that problems
with any input can substantially reduce overall output. Without electricity
or production knowledge or raw materials or security or business licenses,
production is likely to be severely hindered.
Finally, a high elasticity of substitution associated with ﬁnal consumption
delivers a superstar effect, reminiscent of Rosen (1981). In the absence of
1Recent work on this topic includes Romer (1994), Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997),
Prescott (1998), Hall and Jones (1999), Parente and Prescott (1999), Howitt (2000), Parente,
Rogerson and Wright (2000), Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001), Klenow and Rodriguez-
Clare (2005), Manuelli and Seshadri (2005), Caselli and Coleman (2006), Armenter and Lahiri
(2006), Erosa, Koreshkova and Restuccia (2006), Marimon and Quadrini (2006), and Restuccia,
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distortions, GDPdependsdisproportionatelyonthehighestlevelsofproductivity
in the economy.
The contribution of this paper is to build a model in which these ideas can be
made precise. We show that complementarity, superstar effects, and linkages
amplify small distortions to the allocation of resources. With plausible differ-
ences in distortions and productivity across countries, we can easily explain
50-fold differences in per capita income.
The approach taken in this paper can be compared with the recent literature
on political economy and institutions; for example, see Acemoglu and Johnson
(2005) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2005). This paper is more about me-
chanics: can we develop a plausible mechanism for getting a big multiplier, so
that relatively modest distortions lead to large income differences? The mod-
ern institutions approach builds up from political economy. This is useful in
explaining why the allocations in poor countries are inferior — for example,
why investment rates in physical and human capital are so low — but the in-
stitutions approach ultimately still requires a large multiplier to explain income
differences. As just one example, even if a political economy model explains
observed differences in investment rates across countries, the model cannot ex-
plain 50-fold income differences if it is embedded in a neoclassical framework.
The political economy approach explains why resources are misallocated; the
approach here explains why misallocations lead to large income differences.
Clearly, both steps are needed to understand development.
2. LINKAGES, COMPLEMENTARITY, AND SUPERSTARS
We begin by discussing brieﬂy the key mechanisms at work in this paper.
These mechanisms are conceptually distinct — one can have linkages without
complementarity, for example — but they interact in important ways.4 CHARLES I. JONES
2.1. Linkages through Intermediate Goods
Thenotionthatlinkagesacrosssectorscanbecentraltoeconomicperformance
dates back at least to Leontief (1936), which launched the ﬁeld of input-output
economics. Hirschman (1958) emphasized the importance of complementarity
and linkages to economic development. A large subsequent empirical litera-
ture constructed input-output tables for many different countries and computed
sectoral multipliers.
In what may prove to be an ill-advised omission, these insights have not
generally be incorporated into modern growth theory. Linkages between sectors
through intermediate goods deliver a multiplier very much like the multiplier
associated with capital in the neoclassical growth model. More capital leads to
more output, which in turn leads to more capital. This virtuous circle shows up
mathematically as a geometric series which sums to a multiplier of 1
1−α, if α is
capital’s share of overall revenue. Because the capital share is only about 1/3,
this multiplier is relatively small: differences in investment rates are too small
to explain large income differences, and large total factor productivity residuals
are required. This led a number of authors to broaden the deﬁnition of capital,
say toinclude human capital or organizational capital. It isgenerally recognized
that if one can get the capital share up to something like 2/3 — so the multiplier
is 3 — large income differences are much easier to explain without appealing to
a large residual.2
Intermediate goods generate this same kind of multiplier. Inferior highways
that result from corruption can reduce output in a range of sectors, including
construction. But this in turn further reduces the output of highways. In the
modelbelow, thismultiplierdependson 1
1−σ,whereσistheshareofintermediate
2Mankiw, Romer andWeil(1992) isanearlyexampleofthisapproach tohumancapital. Chari,
Kehoe and McGrattan (1997) introduced “organizational capital” for the same reason. Howitt
(2000) and Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (2005) use the accumulation of ideas to boost the
multiplier. More recently, Manuelli and Seshadri (2005) and Erosa et al. (2006) have resurrected
the human capital story in a more sophisticated fashion. The controversy in each of these stories
is over whether or not the additional accumulation raises the multiplier sufﬁciently. Typically,
the problem is that the magnitude of a key parameter is difﬁcult to pin down.INTERMEDIATE GOODS, WEAK LINKS, AND SUPERSTARS 5
inputsingrossoutput. Thisshareisapproximately 1/2intheUnitedStatesandin
other countries, delivering a multiplier of 2. In the model, the overall multiplier
(for example, on productivity) is the product of the intermediate goods and
capital multipliers: 1
1−σ × 1
1−α = 2 × 3/2 = 3. Combining a neoclassical
story of capital accumulation with a standard treatment of intermediate goods
therefore delivers a very powerful engine for explaining income differences
across countries. Related insights pervade the older development literature but
have not had a large inﬂuence on modern growth theory. The main exception is
Ciccone (2002), which appears to be underappreciated.3
2.2. The Role of Complementarity
A large multiplier in growth models is a two-edged sword. On the one
hand, it is extremely useful in getting realistic differences in investment rates,
productivity, and distortions to explain large income differences. However, the
large multiplier has a cost. In particular, theories of economic development
often suffer from a “magic bullet” critique. If the multiplier is so large, then
solving the development problem may be quite easy. For example, this is a
potential problem in the Manuelli and Seshadri (2005) paper: small subsidies
to the production of output or small improvements in a single (exogenous)
productivity level have enormous long-run effects on per capita income in their
model. If there were a single magic bullet for solving the world’s development
problems, one would expect that policy experimentation across countries would
hit on it, at least eventually. The magic bullet would become well-known and
the world’s development problems would be solved.
3Ciccone develops the multiplier formula for intermediate goods and provides some quantita-
tiveexamplesillustratingthat themultiplier canbelarge. Thepoint maybeoverlooked byreaders
of his paper because the model also features increasing returns, externalities, and multiple equi-
libria. Yi (2003) argues that tariffs can multiply up in much the same way when goods get traded
multiple times during the stages of production. Interestingly, the intermediate goods multiplier
shows up most clearly in the economic ﬂuctuations literature; see Long and Plosser (1983), Basu
(1995), Horvath (1998), Dupor (1999), Conley and Dupor (2003), and Gabaix (2005). See also
Hulten (1978).6 CHARLES I. JONES
This is where the second insight of this paper plays it role. Because of com-
plementarity, the development problem may be hard to solve. In any production
process, there are ten things that can go wrong that will sharply reduce the value
of production. In rich countries, there are enough substitution possibilities that
these things donot often gowrong. Inpoor countries, onthe other hand, anyone
of several problems can doom a project. Obtaining the instruction manual for
how to produce socks is not especially useful if the import of knitting equipment
is restricted, if cotton and polyester threads are not available, if property rights
are not secure, and if the market to which these socks will be sold is unknown.
Complementarity is at the heart of the O-ring story put forward by Kremer
(1993). The idea in this paper is similar, but the papers differ substantially in
crucial ways. These differences will be discussed in detail below.
Linkages through intermediate goods provide a large multiplier, while com-
plementarity means that there is typically not a single magic bullet that can
exploit this multiplier. Occasionally, of course, there is. Fixing the last bottle-
neck to development can have large effects on incomes, which may help us to
understand growth miracles.
2.3. An Example of Complementarity
Standardmodelsofproductionoftenemphasizethesubstitutabilityofdifferent
inputs. While substitution will play an important role in the model that follows,
so will complementarity. Since this is less familiar, we begin by focusing our
attention on complementary inputs.4
For this purpose, it is helpful to begin with a simple example. Suppose
you’d like to set up a factory in China to make socks. The overall success
of this project requires success along a surprisingly large number of different
dimensions. These different activities are complementary, so that inefﬁciencies
on any one dimension can sharply reduce overall output.
4Milgrom and Roberts (1990) argue that there are extensive complementarities involved in
production by modern ﬁrms, related to marketing, manufacturing, engineering, design, and
organization.INTERMEDIATE GOODS, WEAK LINKS, AND SUPERSTARS 7
First, theﬁrm needs the basic inputs ofproduction. These include cotton, silk,
and polyester; the sock-knitting machines that spin these threads into socks; a
competent, healthy, and motivated workforce; a factory building; electricity
and other utilities; a means of transporting raw materials and ﬁnished goods
throughout the factory, and so on.
Apart from the physical production of socks, other activities are required to
turn raw materials into revenue. The entire production process must be kept
secure from theft or expropriation. The sock manufacturer must match with
buyers, perhaps in foreign markets, and must ﬁnd a way to deliver the socks
to these buyers. Legal requirements must also be met, both domestically and
in foreign markets. Firms must acquire the necessary licenses and regulatory
approval for production and trade.
Finally, the managers in the ﬁrm require many different kinds of knowledge.
They need to know the technical details of how to make socks. They need
to know how to manage their workforce, how to run an accounting system,
how to navigate a perhaps-intricate web of legal requirements, etc. Notice that
even if the basic inputs are available through trade, these last two paragraphs
of requirements are to a great extent nontradable. Trade may help alleviate the
problems in this paper, but there are likely to be enough non-traded inputs that
domestic weak links can be crucial.
The point of this somewhat tedious enumeration is that production — even of
something as simple as a pair of socks — involves a large number of necessary
activities. If any of these activities are performed inefﬁciently, overall output
can be reduced considerably. Without a reliable supply of electricity, the sock-
making machines cannot be utilized efﬁciently. If workers are not adequately
trained or are unhealthy because of contaminated water supplies, productivity
will suffer. If export licenses are not in order, the socks may sit in a warehouse
rather than being sold. If property is not secure, the socks may be stolen before
they can reach the market.8 CHARLES I. JONES
2.4. Modeling Complementarity and Substitution
A natural way to incorporate varying degrees of complementarity and subti-
tution is with a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function. For example,
suppose
Y =







Let zi denote a ﬁrm’s purchases of the ith input, and assume a continuum of
intermediate inputs are necessary for production. In terms of our sock example,
za could be the quality of the instructions the ﬁrm has for making socks. zb
could be number of sock-making machines, zc might represent the extent to
which the relevant licenses have been obtained, and so on.
The elasticity of substitution among these activities is 1/(1 − η), but this (or
its inverse) could easily be called an elasticity of complementarity instead. For
intermediate inputs, it is plausible to assume η < 0, so the elasticity of substi-
tution is less than one. It is difﬁcult to substitute electricity for transportation
services or raw materials in production. Inputs are more complementary than
in the usual Cobb-Douglas case (η = 0).
Complementarity puts extra weight on the activities in which the ﬁrm is least
successful. This is easy to see in the limiting case where η → −∞; in this case,
the CES function converges to the minimum function, so output is equal to the
smallest of the zi.
This intuition can be pushed further by noting that the CES combination in
equation(1)iscalledthepowermeanoftheunderlyingzi instatistics. Thepower
meanisjustageneralized mean. Forexample, ifη = 1,Y isthearithmetic mean
of the zi. If η = 0, output is the geometric mean (Cobb-Douglas). If η = −1,
output is the harmonic mean, and if η → −∞, output is the minimum of the
zi. From a standard result in statistics, these means decline as η becomes more
negative. Economically, astronger degree ofcomplementarity puts moreweightINTERMEDIATE GOODS, WEAK LINKS, AND SUPERSTARS 9
FIGURE 1. How η Controls the Power Mean












The graph shows a range of power means computed using different
curvature parameters: the higher the curvature parameter, the higher
the power mean. The historgram reﬂects 100,000 draws from a
normal distribution.
on the weakest links and reduces output.5 These differences are illustrated in
Figure 1.
Going in the other direction, if η → +∞, output converges to the maximum
of the zi, a “superstar” kind of production function, like that studied by Rosen
(1981). More generally, the higher is η, the further up the distribution is the
power mean. This case is not usually emphasized in growth models — notice
that it implies a negative elasticity of substitution — but it turns out to play an
important and intuitive role in our model.
5Benabou (1996) studies this approach to complementarity. Interestingly, standard intertem-
poral preferences with a constant relative risk aversion coefﬁcient greater than one represent a
familiar example.10 CHARLES I. JONES
2.5. Comparing to Kremer’s O-Ring Approach
It is useful to compare the way we model complementarity with the O-ring
theory of income differences put forward by Kremer (1993). Superﬁcially, the
theoriesaresimilar, andthegeneralstoryKremertellsishelpfulinunderstanding
the current paper: the space shuttle Challenger and its seven-member crew are
destroyed because of the failure of a single, inexpensive rubber seal.
Thispaper differscrucially intermsofhowthegeneral ideagetsimplemented.
Kremer offers the basic insight that complementarity can generate a large multi-
plier by focusing on the extreme case in which all inputs combine in a Leontief
fashion. The ratio of incomes between a rich and poor country, then, essentially
depends on the extent to which the least productive task in the rich country is
much more productive than the least productive task in the poor country: what
matters is the ratio of minimums. It is not obvious in Kremer’s paper how to
extend his analysis to more standard production setups. That was an initial
motivation of this paper, and in the process, we uncover very different results
associated with the intermediate goods multiplier and superstar effects.6
3. SETTING UP THE MODEL
We now apply this basic discussion of complementarity, substitution, and
linkages to construct a theory of economic development.
3.1. The Economic Environment
A continuum of goods indexed on the unit interval by i are produced in this









6Kremer does not emphasize that his approach embodies a Leonteif technology. Blanchard
and Kremer (1997) formalize this interpretation and study a model of chains of production in
order to understand the large declines in output in the former Soviet Union after 1989. Grossman
and Maggi (2000), motivated in part by Kremer (1993), study trade between countries when
production functions across sectors involve different degrees of complementarity. Other related
papersincludeMurphy, ShleiferandVishny(1989), BeckerandMurphy(1992),Rodriguez-Clare
(1996), and Rodrik (1996).INTERMEDIATE GOODS, WEAK LINKS, AND SUPERSTARS 11
where α and σ are both between zero and one. Ki and Hi are the amounts
of physical capital and human capital used to produce good i, and Ai is an
exogenously-given productivity level. The novel term in this production speci-
ﬁcation is Xi, which denotes the quantity of intermediate goods used to produce
variety i.
Each of these fundamental goods in the economy can be used for one of two
purposes: as a ﬁnal good (ci) or as an intermediate input (zi). Therefore,
ci + zi = Yi. (3)
The next two equations show how these uses affect the economy. In principle,
we could specify a utility function over the continuum of ﬁnal consumption
uses. Instead, it proves more convenient (for modeling capital) to follow the
standard trick of aggregating these ﬁnal uses into a single ﬁnal good, which will
represent GDP in this economy:
Y =





, 0 < θ < 1. (4)
These ﬁnal consumption goods aggregate up with an elasticity of substition
greater than one. Such an aggregator is standard in the literature, dating back to
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), and there are solid estimates of this elasticity that we
will appeal to when it comes time for quantitative analysis.
Whereasconsumption goodscombinewithanelasticity ofsubstitution greater
than one in producing GDP (or utility), intermediate inputs combine with an
elasticity of substitution less than one. This is the key place where “weak links”
enter the model:
X =






, ρ < 0. (5)
This aggregate intermediate good is what gets used by the various sectors of
the economy. To keep the model simple and tractable, we assume that the same
combination of intermediate goods is used to produce each variety (though12 CHARLES I. JONES
potentially in a different quantity). Hence, the resource constraint:7
  1
0
Xi di ≤ X. (6)
An example illustrating the consumption and intermediate goods may be
helpful here. Varieties that are used as intermediate goods involve substantial
complementarity, but when these same varieties combine to produce ﬁnal con-
sumption, there is more substitutability. For example, computer services are
today nearly an essential input into semiconductor design, banking, and health
care. But computers are much more substitutable when used for ﬁnal consump-
tion — for entertainment, we can play computer games or watch television or
ride bikes in the park. In order to produce within a ﬁrm, there are a number of
complementary steps that must be taken. In ﬁnal consumption (e.g. in utility),
however, there appears to be a reasonably high degree of substitution across
goods.
The remainder of the model is standard. The resource constraints for physical
and human capital are   1
0
Ki di ≤ K, (7)
and   1
0
Hi di ≤ H ≡ ¯ h¯ L, (8)
where ¯ h is an exogenously-given amount of human capital per worker and ¯ L is
the exogenous number of workers in the economy, both constant. We do not
endogenize human capital accumulation in this environment in order to keep
the model as simple as possible; this could be added easily, however. Physical
capital accumulates in the usual way, and investment consists of units of the
aggregate ﬁnal good:
˙ K = I − δK, K0 given. (9)
7An issue of timing arises here. To keep the model simple and because we are concerned with
the long run, we make the seemingly strange assumption that intermediate goods are produced
and used simultaneously. A better justiﬁcation goes as follows. Imagine incorporating a lag so
that today’s ﬁnal good is used as tomorrow’s intermediate input. The steady state of that setup
would then deliver the result we have here.INTERMEDIATE GOODS, WEAK LINKS, AND SUPERSTARS 13
C + I ≤ Y. (10)





with u′(C) > 0 and u′′(C) < 0. We’ve dropped time subscripts from this
economic environment (except in this ﬁnal equation) since we will primarily be
concerned with the steady state of this model.
Intermediate goods are similar to capital in that both are produced goods, in
contrast to labor. The key difference is that intermediate goods fully depreciate
in production, but from a long-run perspective, this does not really matter. The
share of produced goods in the production of good i is therefore α(1 − σ) + σ.
For standard parameter values like α = 1/3 and σ = 1/2, this share is 2/3 —
the value needed for neoclassical models to explain large income differences.
The parameter σ measures the importance of linkages in our economy. If σ =
0, theproductivity ofphysical andhumancapital ineachvarietydepends onlyon
Ai and is independent of the rest of the economy. To the extent that σ > 0, low
productivity in one sector feeds back into the others. Transportation services
may be unproductive in a poor country because of inadequate fuel supplies
or repair services, and this low productivity will reduce output throughout the
economy.
4. A SYMMETRIC ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES
Before turning to a competitive equilibrium in this environment, it is useful
to consider a simple “rule of thumb” allocation, analogous to Solow’s ﬁxed
saving rate. There are two advantages to this approach. First, it is simple, easy
to solve for, and allows us to illustrate some of the key points of the model.
Second, it serves as a useful benchmark when it comes time to understand why
the competitive equilibrium looks the way it does. Our rule of thumb allocation
is a symmetric allocation with a constant investment rate:14 CHARLES I. JONES
Definition 1. The symmetric allocation of resources in this economy has
Ki = K, Hi = H, Xi = X, I = ¯ sY , and zi = ¯ zYi, where 0 < ¯ s, ¯ z < 1.
Under this symmetric allocation, the solution for GDP in the economy at any
point in time is given in the following proposition. (Outlines of all proofs are in
the Appendix.)
Proposition 1. the symmetric allocation, given capital: Given
K units of capital, GDP under the symmetric allocation of resources is
















φ(¯ z) ≡ ((1 − ¯ z)1−σ¯ zσ)
1
1−σ (14)
and Sθ is deﬁned in a way analogous to Sρ.
The model delivers a simple expression for GDP. Y is the familiar Cobb-
Douglas combination of aggregate physical and human capital with constant
returns to scale.
Twonovelresults also emerge, andbotharerelated tototalfactor productivity.
The ﬁrst illustrates the role of substitution versus complementarity, while the
second reveals the multiplier associated with linkages through intermediate
goods.
First, consider the Sθ and Sρ terms. Each is a CES combination of the
underlying sectoral TFPs. Since θ is between zero and one, Sθ is between the
geometric mean and the arithmetic mean of the TFPs. But with ρ less than zero,
Sρ ranges from the geometric mean down to the minimum of the underlying
Ai, depending on the strength of complementarity. Total factor productivity for
the economy as a whole depends on the geometric average of the CES terms,INTERMEDIATE GOODS, WEAK LINKS, AND SUPERSTARS 15
S1−σ
θ Sσ
ρ. The “substitutes” term gets a weight that equals the share of value-
addedingrossoutput, whilethe“complements”termSρ getsaweightthatequals
the intermediate goods share of gross output, σ. In other words, the importance
of “weak links” in production depends on (i) the extent of complementarity and
(ii) the relative importance of intermediate goods.
To interpret this result, it is helpful to consider the special case where θ = 1,
ρ → −∞, and σ = 1/2. In this case, TFP is the product of the average of the
Ai and the minimum of the Ai. Aggregate TFP then depends crucially on the
smallest levelofTFPacross thesectors oftheeconomy —thatis, ontheweakest
link. Firms in the United States and Kenya may not differ that much in average
efﬁciency, but ifthe distribution of Kenyan ﬁrmshas asubstantially worse lower
tail, overall economic performance will suffer because of complementarity.
The second property of this solution worth noting is the multiplier associ-
ated with intermediate goods. Total factor productivity involves a multiplier,
the exponent 1
1−σ > 1. A simple example should make the reason for this
transparent. Suppose Yt = aXσ
t and Xt = sYt−1; output depends in part on
intermediate goods, and the intermediate goods are themselves produced using
output from the previous period. Solving these two equations in steady state
gives Y ∗ = a
1
1−σsσ/1−σ, which is a simpliﬁed version of what is going on in
our model. Notice that if we call X “capital” instead of intermediate goods, the
same formulas would apply and this looks like the neoclassical growth model
withfulldepreciation. Intermediate goodsareanother sourceofproduced inputs
in a growth model.
The economic intuition for this multiplier is also straightforward. Problems
in electric power generation reduces output in the banking and construction
industries. This in turn hinders the ﬁnancing and construction of new dams
and electric power plants, further reducing output in electric power generation.
Linkages between sectors within the economy generate a multiplier through
which productivity problems get ampliﬁed.16 CHARLES I. JONES
Finally, consider the role of φ(¯ z). Differences in the allocation of resources
to intermediate uses show up as aggregate TFP differences in this environment.
Moreover, this term is a hump-shaped function of ¯ z which is maximized at
¯ z = σ. Not surprisingly, this turns out to be the optimal amount of gross output
to spend on intermediate goods. Departures from this optimal amount will
reduce TFP.
5. A COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM WITH WEDGES
The symmetric allocation is useful as quick guide to how the model works,
but it is clearly not optimal to allocate resources symmetrically in this economy
(at least as long as the Ai differ). We turn now to a more interesting allocation,
the competitive equilibrium in the presence of micro-level distortions.
Thisapproach builds onworkbyChari, KehoeandMcGrattan(2007), Restuc-
cia and Rogerson (2007) and Hsieh and Klenow (2007), who argue that misallo-
cation at the micro level shows up at the macro level as a reduction in aggregate
TFP. Micro-level distortions can be actual formal taxes, which is how they are
modeled here for simplicity. However, these wedges can also be viewed as
standing in for many other possible distortions, including theft, expropriation,
preferential credit arrangements, product and labor market regulations, protec-
tion from competition, and so on.
Akeyquestion thatarisesisthis: candistortions ofthemagnitudes weobserve
generate 50-fold income differences. In simple neoclassical models, we know
the answer to this question is “no.” Hsieh and Klenow, for example, show that
misallocations across ﬁrms within an industry reduce output by a factor of 2 or
3. What is needed is a multiplier to magnify the effects of these distortions.
Intermediate goods, weak links, and superstar effects provide these multipliers,
as we see next.INTERMEDIATE GOODS, WEAK LINKS, AND SUPERSTARS 17
5.1. Optimization Problems
Before deﬁning the competitive equilibrium, it is convenient to specify the
optimization problems in the economy. Letting the ﬁnal output good be the
num´ eraire, these problems are described below.
Household Problem: Taking the time path of interest rates, wages, and
lump sum taxes (rt, wt, and Tt) as given, and given an initial stock of assets V0,







˙ Vt = rtVt + wtH + Tt − Ct,
and subject to a no Ponzi-scheme condition.
Final Sector Problem: Taking the prices of the consumption varieties
{pi} as given, a representative ﬁrm in the perfectly competitive ﬁnal goods
market solves at each point in time
max
{ci}









Intermediate Sector Problem: Taking the price of the intermediate
varieties {pi} and the price of the aggregate intermediate good q as given,
a representative ﬁrm in the perfectly competitive intermediate goods market














Variety i’s Problem: Taking pi,r,w,q and τi as given, a representative










i − (r + δ)Ki − wHi − qXi.18 CHARLES I. JONES
5.2. Deﬁning the Competitive Equilibrium
Definition 1. A competitive equilibrium in this economy consists of time
paths for the quantities Y,X,C,I,K,V,T,{Yi,Ki,Hi,Xi}, {ci,zi} and prices
{pi},q,w,r such that
1. C and V solve the Household Problem.
2. {ci} solve the Final Sector Problem.
3. {zi} solve the Intermediate Sector Problem.
4. Ki,Hi,Xi solve the Variety i Problem for all i ∈ [0,1].
5. Markets clear:
r clears the capital market: V = K
w clears the labor market:
  1
0 Hidi = H
pi clears market i: ci + zi = Yi for all i ∈ [0,1]
q clears the intermediate goods market:
  1
0 Xidi = X.
6. The government’s budget is balanced: T =
  1
0 τipiYidi.
7. Other aspects of the environment hold:
˙ K = I − δK
  1





















Counting loosely, our competitive equilibrium involves 17 endogenous vari-
ables and speciﬁes 17 equations to pin them down. Gross domestic product Y
is the numeraire in this economy, and the market for this good clears by Walras’
Law (so that C + I = Y is redundant).
5.3. Solving for the Competitive Equilibrium
We now discuss the solution of the model, beginning with a result character-
izing the aggregate production of GDP at any point in time.INTERMEDIATE GOODS, WEAK LINKS, AND SUPERSTARS 19
Proposition 2. the competitive equilibrium, given capital:

























where τ ≡ T/(Y + qX) is the average tax rate in the economy, measured
relative to gross output, and Qθ is deﬁned in a way analogous to Qρ.8
Several insights emerge from this result. Two we can get through quickly,
while the third requires more consideration. First, the multiplier associated
with intermediate goods appears in exactly the same way as in the symmetric
allocation, and for the same reason. This multiplier is a fundamental feature of
theeconomyreﬂectingthepresenceofadditionalproducedfactorsofproduction.
Itmultiplies anydistortion associated withmisallocation but isnotitself affected
by the allocation of resources.
Second, the tax wedges affect output through TFP.Therefore, this proposition
illustrates a very important result found elsewhere in the macro literature: the
misallocation of resources at the microeconomic level often shows up as a
reduction in TFP at the macroeconomic level. This result has been emphasized
by Chari et al. (2007), Hsieh and Klenow (2007), and Restuccia and Rogerson
(2007), and also plays a key role in Caselli and Gennaioli (2005) and Lagos
8 The solution for τ satisﬁes








1−ρ di. That is, Tρ is a weighted average of the sector-speciﬁc
tax rates, where the weights depend on ρ; Tθ is deﬁned analogously.20 CHARLES I. JONES
(2006). Importantly, the tax wedges get multiplied by the intermediate goods
multiplier. We will discuss the effect of these wedges in more detail below.
Finally, a key difference relative to the previous result on the symmetric al-
location is that the curvature parameter determining the productivity aggregates
haschanged. Forexample,
ρ
1−ρ replaces theoriginal ρ. Noticethatifthedomain
of ρ is [0,−∞), the range of
ρ
1−ρ is [0,−1): there is less complementarity in
determining Qρ than Sρ.
This result can be illustrated with an example. Suppose ρ → −∞. In this
case, the symmetric allocation depends on the smallest of the Ai, the pure weak
link story. In contrast, the equilibrium allocation depends on the harmonic
mean of the (tax adjusted) productivities, since
ρ
1−ρ → −1. Disasterously low
productivity in a single variety is fatal in the symmetric allocation, but not in the
equilibrium allocation. Why not?
Thereasonisthattheequilibrium allocation isabletostrengthen weaklinksby
allocatingmoreresourcestoactivitieswithlowproductivity. Ifthetransportation
sector has especially low productivity that would otherwise be very costly to the
economy, the equilibrium allocation can put extra physical and human capital
in that sector to help offset its low productivity and prevent this sector from
becoming a bottleneck. Of course, this must be balanced by the desire to
give this sector a low amount of resources in an effort to substitute away from
transportation on the consumption side. This can be seen in the math: the





















Another perspective on the solution is gained by returning to a special case
we considered earlier. Suppose θ = 1, ρ → −∞, and σ = 1/2, and suppose
τi = 0. In this case, Qθ → maxAi while Qρ becomes the harmonic mean of
the Ai. Total factor productivity is the product of the two. Contrast this with
the same example for the symmetric allocation: there, TFP was the product of
the arithmetic mean and the minimum. Allocating resources optimally shiftsINTERMEDIATE GOODS, WEAK LINKS, AND SUPERSTARS 21
up both of these generalized means. The strengthening of weak links leads
the minimum to be replaced by the harmonic mean. Similarly, if consumption
goods enter as perfect substitutes, only the good with the highest productivity
will be consumed: the arithmetic mean gets replaced by the “max,” a superstar
effect.
This example illustrates an intuitive way that the model can lead to large in-
come differences across countries. Suppose a “rich” country allocates resources
as in a competitive equilibrium with no taxes, but a “poor” country distorts the
allocation sufﬁciently that it looks like the symmetric allocation. In the special
case we are considering here, relative TFP between these two countries will be
the product of two terms. First is the ratio of average TFP between the two
countries, a standard term. But second is the ratio of the maximum TFP in the
rich country to the minimum TFP in the poor country. Even if both countries
have identical TFPdistributions, this misallocation can leadtoalarge gap driven
by the max-min effects associated with superstar and weak link forces. With
less extreme parameter values, these forces are still in play, of course, as we will
see in the numerical examples later on.
5.4. The Steady State
Next, we see that the long-run multiplier in the model depends on the overall
share of produced factors — capital as well as intermediate goods. We get the
1/1−α effect since capital accumulates in response to a change in productivity
or taxes.
Proposition 3. the competitive equilibrium in steady state:
Let y ≡ Y/¯ L. Thecompetitive equilibrium exhibits asteady state in whichGDP






















1−α.22 CHARLES I. JONES
Suppose we compare two economies. For reasons we can leave unspeciﬁed
at the moment, sectoral TFPs are twice as high in one economy as in the other.
How large are the income differences we would expect to see across these two
economies, ignoring all other differences?
Let’s answer this question for two worlds. The ﬁrst is a standard neoclassical
worldwherethere arenointermediate goods, soσ = 0. Inthiscase, we’dexpect
toseeincomedifferencesof23/2 = 2.8. Nowconsideraworldwithintermediate
goods, and suppose the intermediate goods share is σ = 1/2, a value we will
justify later on. In this case, we’d expect to see much larger differences in GDP
per worker in the long run. The multiplier is 1
1−σ
1
1−α = 2× 3
2 = 3, yielding an
income difference of 23 = 8 times.
Another way to view this multiplier is to note that the share of produced
factors in any sector’s production function is β ≡ α(1 − σ) + σ; this is the
sum of the exponent on capital and the exponent on intermediate goods. The
multiplier is also equal to 1




5.5. Symmetric Tax Wedges
Tax wedges enter the competitive equilibrium solution in two ways. First,
there is the ψ(τ) term, which is analogous to the φ(¯ z) term in the symmetric
allocation. This term captures (part of) the tradeoff between devoting resources
to intermediate versus ﬁnal uses. This is seen more clearly in the results below,
where we ﬁrst consider a symmetric tax across all sectors and then move on to
study log-normally distributed tax wedges.
Proposition 4. symmetric tax wedges: Suppose the taxrate isiden-
tical across sectors: τi = ¯ τ. Let z∗ ≡
qX
Y +qX denote the equilibrium fraction
of gross output spent on intermediate goods. Then z∗ = σ(1 − ¯ τ), and GDP at
any given point in time is
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where
˜ Qρ ≡









and ˜ Qθ is deﬁned analogously. Moreover, GDP per worker in steady state is












1−α ¯ h, (21)
where ζ1 is a collection of terms that do not depend on ¯ τ.
Theﬁrstpartofthispropositionhighlightsasimilaritybetweenthecompetitive
equilibrium with a symmetric tax and the symmetric allocation we studied
earlier. The overall effect of the tax is to distort the allocation of resources
between ﬁnal use and intermediate use. GDP is maximized at ¯ τ = 0.
The second part of the proposition shows explicitly the different effects a
symmetric tax has on GDP per worker in the steady state. The ﬁrst term is
1−z∗ = 1−σ(1− ¯ τ). Notice that this term is an increasing function of the tax
rate and reﬂects the fact that taxes lead to lower spending on intermediate goods
and therefore higher spending on ﬁnal uses. The second terms is the tax wedge
raised to a power that depends on the overall multiplier in the model. In fact,
letting β denote the overall share of produced factors in the sectoral production
function (both intermediates and capital), this second tax term can be written as
(1 − ¯ τ)
β
1−β. The 1/1 − β term captures the standard multiplier effects of the
model. The fact that the exponent is the product of this multiplier and β itself
reﬂects the fact that only the fraction β of the factors of production get distorted
by a symmetric tax. In particular, the allocation of human capital across sectors
is not distorted.
This raises an interesting question: if the tax is symmetric, why does it distort
anything at all? The answer is that it is symmetric across sectors, but not
symmetric over time. In particular, goods that are used for ﬁnal uses pay the tax
only once, when they are produced. However, a good devoted to intermediate
uses pays the tax each time production occurs, and it is this that leads to the24 CHARLES I. JONES
multiplier effects. This can be viewed as a simple application of the ideas
in Diamond and Mirrlees (1971), Chamley (1986), and Judd (1985) regarding
the taxation of intermediate goods and capital. From the long-run perspective,
capital is just an intermediate good: both are produced factors of production.
The distortion associated with ¯ τ gets multiplied by the production structure of
the economy.
5.6. Random Tax Wedges
The symmetric tax distorts the allocation of resources in an intertemporal
sense, but does not otherwise distort the allocation across the sectors of the
economy. As discussed in the introduction, however, one of the key ways in
which weak links can be a problem in a country is if resources are misallocated
across ﬁrms or sectors: electricity may be absolutely essential to production,
and problems in that sector can lead to severe disruptions.
To get a sense of how misallocation across ﬁrms can matter, we suppose tax
wedges and productivity levels are distributed log-normally across our contin-
uum of sectors. In particular, we have the following result:
Proposition 5. random productivity and wedges: Let ai ≡
logAi and ωi ≡ log(1 − τi) be jointly normally distributed so that ai ∼
N( a,ν2
a) and ωi ∼ N( ω,ν2
ω) and Cov(ωi,ai) = νaω . Finally, let ν2 ≡
ν2
a + ν2
ω + 2νaω. Then
logy∗ =log
 
1 − σ(1 − τ)
1 − τ
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GDP per person in steady state depends on two main terms, B and A, which
we discuss in turn. Term B involves the CES aggregators, and notice that pro-
ductivities and the tax wedges enter symmetrically: this term depends basically
on the properties of Ai(1 − τi), or, in logs, ai + ωi. Both the means and the
overall variance are subject to the fundamental multiplier of the model. The
variance term also depends on the degrees of substitution and complementarity,





Term A involves only the wedges, not the productivities. It captures the
offsetting effect associated with the fact that taxes reduce intermediate use and
hence raise ﬁnal use.
The last part of the proposition makes the important point that variation in
the tax wedges across sectors unambigously reduces GDP.Efﬁciency, of course,
requires no tax wedges at all. This result can be contrasted with the effect of
variation in productivity. Changes in ν2
a have an ambiguous effect. From the
standpoint of ﬁnal uses, a higher variance is a good thing. For example (loosely
speaking), if goods were perfect substitutes in consumption, only the good with
the highest productivity would be consumed, and a higher variance increases
the highest productivity. From the standpoint of intermediate goods, however,
the opposite is true.
6. DEVELOPMENT ACCOUNTING
To what extent can this model with intermediate goods, complementarity, and
superstar effects explain income differences across countries? In this section,
we attempt to quantify the mechanisms at work in our theory.
In the analysis that follows, some key parameters — such as the intermediate
goods share — are calibrated quite precisely, while others — such as the degree26 CHARLES I. JONES
ofcomplementarity ortheprecise nature ofmicro-level distortions —areknown
with much less precision. The robust result that emerges from these quantitative
exercises is that intermediate goods, complementarity, and superstar effects can
substantially magnify income differences relative to the standard neoclassical
growth model, even with quite conservative choices for the parameter values.
6.1. Measuring the Intermediate Goods Share, σ
For reasons that have already been explained, the crucial parameter of the
model for explaining large income differences across countries is the interme-
diate goods share, σ. Fortunately, there is detailed empirical evidence about the
magnitude of this parameter.
Basu(1995)recommendsavalueof0.5basedonthenumbersfromJorgenson,
Gollop and Fraumeni (1987) for the U.S. economy between 1947 and 1979.
Ciccone (2002), citing the extensive analysis in Chenery, Robinson and Syrquin
(1986), observes that the intermediate goods share at least sometimes rises with
the level of development. However, the numbers cited for South Korea, Taiwan,
and Japan in the early 1970s are all substantially higher than conventional U.S.
estimates, ranging from 61% to 80%.
Fortunately, there areveryrich datasets oninput-output tables formanycoun-
tries. For example, the OECD Input-Ouput database now covers 37 countries
(including 9 non-OECD countries) at the level of 48 industries for a year close
to 2000; see Yamano and Ahmad (2006). Historical data are available for a
number of these countries as well. Using the summary tables in Yamano and
Ahmad (2006) one can calculate intermediate good shares of gross output for
different countries. For the United States, Japan, and India, these shares are all
about 46%. For China, the share is 64%. Across 21 countries (mostly OECD,
but including Brazil, China, and India as well), the average intermediate goods
share is 52.4%, with a standard deviation of about 6%. These numbers are
discussed in greater detail in Jones (2007a). Given all of this evidence, we take




σ 1/2 Intermediate goods share of gross output
α 1/3 Conventional value for capital share
¯ h
r/¯ h
p 2 Standard contribution from education
θ 1/1.2 Consistent with 20% markups




p {1,1/2} Illustrative purposes
γ
r 2 Gives a 90/10 ratio of 4.96
γ
p {2,2.87} Doubles the 90/10 ratio
¯ τ0 0.9 Maximum tax rate
ξ ... To match capital-output ratio factor of 3
Note: Robustness to these baseline values is explored below. Values for ξ vary according to the
simulation. In the baseline case, the values are 0.994 and 1.112 for Scenarios 3 and 4 below.
6.2. Other Parameter Values
The baseline parameter values we use are summarized in Table 1. Robustness
checks will consider departures from these values. We pick α = 1/3 to match
the empirical evidence on capital shares; see Gollin (2002), who shows that
capital shares across countries have a mean of 1/3 and are uncorrelated with
GDP per worker. Rather than modeling differences in human capital we simply
assume that across the richest and poorest countries, these differences contribute
a factor of 2 to income differences.9
For the substitution elasticity, we take as our baseline value an elasticity of
substitution in consumption of 1/1 − θ = 6, so that 1/θ = 1.2; in a model
with monopolistic competition, this elasticity would deliver markups on the
order of 20%. This value is consistent with the extensive estimates provided by
Broda and Weinstein (2006). For the complementarity parameter ρ, we assume
ρ = −1, which delivers an elasticity of substitution among intermediate goods
9This factor of 2 is consistent with Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997) and Hall and Jones
(1999). Earlier versions of this paper endogenized human capital using a Mincerian model
of schooling that allowed individuals to choose the number of years they attended school so
as to maximizes their expected lifetime income; see Jones (2007b). This approach can easily
rationalize the factor of 2 that is assumed for the neoclassical effects.28 CHARLES I. JONES
of 1/2, midway between Leontief and Cobb-Douglas. There is very little solid
information about this parameter and we will carefully explore robustness to
other values in what follows.
For understanding how the model works, it proves useful to let taxes and
productivity be deterministic functions of the variety index i (as opposed to
assuming they are log normally distributed, for example). In particular, we
assume the following functions:
Ai = ¯ Ae−γi (22)
τi =
 
¯ τ0 + 1 − eξi i ∈ [0,1/2]
τ1−i i ∈ (1/2,1]
(23)
We normalize the order of varieties so that productivity decreases with the index
i; moreover, we assume this occurs exponentially. Taxes are a symmetric “v”-
shaped function of variety, with high tax rates of ¯ τ0 at the ends and a low tax
rate in the middle. The advantage of this structure is that both superstar and
weak link problems appear: resources are allocated away from the superstar and
weakest links and towards mid-productivity sectors. The remaining parameters
in the table pin down these productivities and tax wedges.
Four parameters — ¯ Ar, ¯ Ap, γr, and γp — characterize the distibution of
TFPs across varieties. One source of information about these parameters is
Hsieh and Klenow (2007). Hsieh and Klenow measure ﬁrm-level TFP within
4-digit manufacturing sectors for China, India, and the United States. They ﬁnd
that the90/10 ratios ofﬁrm-levelTFP(inavalue-added production function) are
about 16 for the United States, 12 for China, and 31 for India. These statistics
do not correspond exactly to what we want for our model. We’d like to see
the variation across all ﬁrms and sectors in the economy. For example, the
weak link story involves electricity, transportation, replacement parts, machine
tools, etc. — inputs that are taken from different sectors of the economy. We’d
also like some sense of differences in things like property rights and corruption.
Moreover, the mapping between their value-added TFP and our gross-outputINTERMEDIATE GOODS, WEAK LINKS, AND SUPERSTARS 29
TFP is not entirely clear.10 Finally, measurement problems may lead Hsieh and
Klenow to overstate TFP differences across ﬁrms.
Still, these are useful observations to get us started. Based on these numbers,
we consider a conservative choice of parameter values. We normalize ¯ Ar = 1,
and consider two alternatives for ¯ Ap: that it equals one as well and that it
takes a value of 1/2. For the decay rate across varieties, we pick γr = 2, so
that the 90/10 ratio for our rich country is only 4.96. For the poor country,
we will sometimes use this same value, so that both countries have the same
distribution of TFP. Alternatively, we will consider γp = 2.87, which leads the
poor country to have a 90/10 ratio that is twice as high as the rich country (as in
the U.S.-India comparison in Hsieh and Klenow). Future work on productivity
differences across sectors could potentially shed better light on these parameter
values. Figure 2 shows these different productivity scenarios.
Finally, we need to parameterize the tax differences across countries. For
the rich country, we assume τr
i = 0 so there are no distortions. For the poor
country, we have two parameters describing taxes, the maximum tax rate ¯ τ0
and the decay rate ξ. Since capital can be viewed as an intermediate good, the












1 − σ(1 − τ)
. (24)
That is, the capital-output ratio depends on the average tax share collected in
the economy. Capital-output ratios and investment rates vary by something like
a factor of 3 across countries. This implies a value of τp = 1/2 (assuming
σ = 1/2). Note that τp is an endogenous variable, not a parameter. We assume
the maximum tax rate ¯ τ0 is 90%, and choose the decay rate ξ to match the
average share of tax revenues of 1/2.
Figure 3 shows the assumed tax wedges in the poor country (for one key
scenario below). Notice that distortions are highest for the most and least
10Simple models can lead one to see this difference as undoing the multiplier. In this model,
however, the standard deviation of value-added TFP and the standard deviation of gross-output
TFP across ﬁrms is equal (in the absence of tax wedges).30 CHARLES I. JONES
FIGURE 2. Assumed Productivities

















Note: In some simulations, we assume the rich and poor country
have the same productivity levels (indicated by the “Rich” curve). In
others, we let the 90/10 ratio for the “Poor” country be twice as large
as for the “Rich” country.INTERMEDIATE GOODS, WEAK LINKS, AND SUPERSTARS 31
FIGURE 3. Assumed Tax Wedges (Scenario 4)








                     Tax Wedge,   τ
i
Mean = 0.563
 Min = 0.157
   ξ = 1.112
Note: The graph shows the tax wedges for Scenario 4 below. The
maximum tax rate at the end points is ¯ τ0 = 0.90. The decay rate ξ
is chosen to deliver a tax share of gross output of 1/2, reducing the
capital-output ratiobyafactorof3inthepoor country. Taxschedules
look similar in other scenarios.32 CHARLES I. JONES
TABLE 2.
Output per Worker Ratios: Quantitative Examples
No Interme-
— Substitution & Complementarity — diate Goods
Scenario Baseline θ = 1/1.1 θ = 1/1.3 ρ = −100 σ = 0





i = 2 42.7 42.7 42.7 42.7 9.8
2. Ap90/10 twice as high 12.9 12.3 13.6 14.4 3.9
3. Tax wedges in poor 19.6 25.0 16.8 22.4 6.3





i = 2 + taxes 156.5 200.1 134.2 178.9 17.8
Note: The table reports income ratios between rich and poor countries under various scenarios.
The benchmark case has no TFP differences across countries and a constant tax rate across
varieties, so only the neoclassical factors appear — a difference of 2 from human capital and a
difference of
√
3 from the capital-output ratio; so with σ = 0, the differences is 2×
√
3 ≈ 3.5.
The last column shows the results when the intermediate goods share is zero (and where
ρ = −1). (In solving numerically, we evaluate the integrals as summations over 1001 grid
points.)
productive sectors. This will give rise to superstar and weak link problems.
6.3. Quantitative Analysis
Table 2 shows the quantitative results for the model. It is easiest to begin in
the upper right portion of the table, which shows the baseline case when the
intermediate goods share is zero.
The benchmark case features Ai’s that vary across sectors but which are
identical in the rich and poor country. The rich country features no tax wedges,
while the poor country has τi = 1/2, so the wedges do not vary across sectors.
This overall tax and the 2-fold difference in human capital are the only sources
of income differences in the benchmark case. As shown in the table, when the
intermediate goods share is zero, these differences lead to an income ratio of 3.5
between the rich and poor countries. This value is equal to the 2-fold human
capital difference multiplied by the
√
3 contribution from the tax rate, working
through the capital-output ratio. The other columns of the table show how thisINTERMEDIATE GOODS, WEAK LINKS, AND SUPERSTARS 33
effect gets ampliﬁed when intermediate goods are distorted, as well as capital,
leading to a 5.3-fold income difference.
Scenario 1 introduces an extra 2-fold difference in the Ai between the rich
and poor countries to illustrate some basic forces in the model. This difference
could arise from technological differences, or could simply reﬂect theft. Under
the theft interpretation, 50% of output gets stolen any time a good is produced.
In the pure neoclassical framework with no intermediate goods, this 2-fold
difference in TFP ampliﬁes the income differences by 21/1−α = 23/2 ≈ 2.8 to
yield a difference of 9.8. The other columns illustrate the power of the interme-





1−α = 22×3/2 = 23 = 8, yielding a much larger income difference of
42.7. The intuition is that the “theft tax” gets paid repeatedly when intermediate
goods are involved: 1/2 of the steel is stolen from the steel plant, 1/2 of the cars
are stolen from the automobile plant, and 1/2 of the pizzas get stolen from the
pizza delivery service. In this sense, the steel gets stolen three times rather than
just once, and this is the intermediate goods multiplier.
The remaining scenarios explore the roles of weak links and superstar effects
in this environment. Scenario 2 shows the competitive equilibrium allocation
of resources with no variation in taxes, but this time allows the 90/10 ratio to
be twice as wide in the poor country as in the rich country (as shown back in
Figure 2). By itself, this change leads to relatively small income differences, in
part because the competitive equilibrium shufﬂes resources around tostrengthen
weak links and take advantage of superstar varieties.
Scenario 3 returns to the case where the rich and poor countries have identical
Ai but this time allows tax wedges to distort the allocation of resources in
the poor country. In the absence of the intermediate goods multiplier, these
tax wedges increase the income ratio from 3.5 to 6.3. In the baseline case,
the presence of intermediate goods raises this ratio to 19.6. This ratio gets
increased further to 25.0 in the case where the elasticity of substitution among
consumption goods is higher (θ = 1/1.1): the higher is this elasticity, the more34 CHARLES I. JONES
FIGURE 4. Scenario 4: Taxes and Allocations
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from both the superstar sectors and the weak link sectors.
costly are tax distortions, as they push the allocation away from the superstar
varieties.
While the other scenarios have considered one change at atime awayfrom the
baseline case in the ﬁrst row, Scenario 4 combines the two changes in Scenarios
2 and 3. Tax wedges vary across sectors (as shown in Figure 3), and now the
90/10 ratio of Ai in the poor country is twice as wide as in the rich (as in
Figure 2), so the distortions are even more costly. A neoclassical difference
of 7.9 (for σ = 0) gets ampliﬁed to 53.2 in the baseline case. With a higher
elasticity ofsubstitution among consumption, superstar effects raise this to63.9.
With extreme complementarity (ρ = −100), weak link forces deliver an income
ratio of 72.9.
Figure 4 shows the effect of these tax wedges on the allocation of resources
in the poor country. The dark (blue) line shows the tax wedge for each variety,
which we have already seen in an earlier ﬁgure. The lighter (green) lines revealINTERMEDIATE GOODS, WEAK LINKS, AND SUPERSTARS 35
the allocation of resources. The solid one plots the equilibrium allocation of
Ki/K across varieties, while the dashed line shows the optimal allocation.
These differ sharply. The “v”-shaped tax wedge distorts the allocation away
from both the highly-productive sectors and the least-productive sectors. At
high productivities, the superstar sectors are harmed, which has a large effect
on output. At low productivities, the weakest links are not strengthened, which
againhasalargeeffectonoutput. Togetherwiththegeneralmultiplierassociated
with intermediate goods, these forces explain why the model is able to deliver
such large income differences from relatively small productivity differences and
small tax distortions.
Finally, Scenario 5 in Table 2 is a simple way of illustrating that it is easy
to get even larger income differences in this model; the earlier scenarios in the
table are by no means extreme. In Scenario 5, we assume productivities in the
poor country are half the level of productivities in the rich country and allow
the “v”-shaped tax wedges to distort the allocation of resources. Income ratios
of 150 or more are possible in this scenario. Similarly large differences can be
achieved in other ways, such as by letting the variation in Ai across varieties be
even larger.
6.4. Summary
Some of the parameters of the model — like the intermediate goods share
and the capital share — are quite precisely pinned down by empirical evidence.
Others — like the strength of substitution and complementarity and the extent
and nature of resource misallocation — are known with much less precision.
The point of these numerical examples is not to claim that they precisely
characterize the nature of income differences between the richest and poorest
countries. Rather, they illustrate that these mechanisms are able to generate
enormous differences using relatively conservative choices of parameter values.
Fortunately, the high value of the intermediate goods share by itself goes a
long way toward helping us understand large income differences across coun-
tries. The aggregate productivity index Q may differ by a factor of 2 for many36 CHARLES I. JONES
reasons: distortions to technology adoption, complementarity and weak links,
or the misallocation of resources. Whatever the cause, the intermediate goods
multiplier leads relatively small and plausible differences in Q to magnify into
large income differences across countries. The economics of this magniﬁcation
is quite intuitive. Because of linkages across sectors, the misallocation of re-
sources in one sector affects output in others, which in turn feeds back into the
original sector.
7. THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF REFORMS
The model possesses two key features that seem desirable in any theory
designed to explain the large differences in incomes across countries. First,
relatively small and plausible differences in underlying parameters can yield
large differences in incomes. That is, the model generates a large multiplier.
The second feature is one we explore now. Despite this large multiplier,
reforms that eliminate the tax wedges may have relatively small effects on
output. If a chain has a number of weak links, ﬁxing one or two of them will
not change the overall strength of the chain.
This principle is clearly true in the extreme Leontief case, but it holds more
generally as well. To see this, consider a simple exercise. Suppose the economy
is characterized by Scenario 3 above: it has the “v”-shaped tax wedges but
is otherwise identical to the richest country in the world, apart from a 2-fold
difference in human capital. A sequence of reforms then eliminates the tax
wedges one at a time. As was shown in Table 2, our poor country begins
with an income about 1/20th of that in the rich country. For this exercise,
we approximate the continuum of varieties with a 300-point grid, so after 300
reforms, the poor country will have an income of 1/2 the rich country, due only
to the human capital difference. The question is this: what does the transition
path look like as the economy undergoes these reforms?
Figure 5 showsthe sequence ofsteady states that results from several different
paths of reform. The “best path” solves for the reform in each period thatINTERMEDIATE GOODS, WEAK LINKS, AND SUPERSTARS 37
FIGURE 5. The Cumulative Effect of Reforms
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Best Path
Worst Path
Note: The economy is initially characterized as in Scenario 3, where
we approximate the continuum of varieties with a 300-point grid.
Each period, one of the tax wedges is eliminated. The plot shows the
sequence of steady states that result, depending on the nature of the
reform process.38 CHARLES I. JONES
increases output by the most. The “worst path” ﬁnds the reform that increases
output by the least. The other two paths start with either i = 0 (the most
productive sector) ori = 1(theleast productive sector) andproceed sequentially
across the varieties.
The key point of the ﬁgure is that three of the four paths considered feature
long, ﬂat regions — substantial periods of reform that have relatively small
impacts on incomes. For example, for the “worst path” reforms, the ﬁrst
doubling ofincomesdoesnotoccur untilnearly 60%ofthesectors arereformed;
the second doubling occurs much more rapidly, by the 80% reform point.
It is interesting to compare the two paths in the middle, which proceed by
reforming the most productive versus least productive sectors ﬁrst. Initially,
reforming the most productive sectors has a large effect on output: these are
some of the most distorted sectors, and because of the role of high substitution
in consumption, reforms to a superstar sector can increase output substantially.
However, once a few superstar sectors are ﬁxed, subsequent gains are harder to
come by: the weak link sectors are reformed last, and these exert a substantial
negative effect on output.
Starting with the least productive sectors leads to a different pattern. Because
of complementarity, ﬁxing a few weak links has relatively small effects on
output. When the economy suffers from many problems, reforms that address
only a few may have small effects. The large output gains at the end result from
the superstar distortions being removed.
Interestingly, the sharp curvature of these paths suggests that the pressure for
reform can accelerate. This general setup may then help us to understand why
some countries remain unreformed and poor for long periods while others —
those that are close to the cusp — experience growth miracles.
Hausmann, Rodrik andVelasco (2005) advocate studying allofthedistortions
in an economy and quantifying the output gains from relaxing each distortion.
Clearly, such an approach would work well in this environment — this leads
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distortions. In particular, reforms in poor countries can “fail” because numerous
other distortions keep output low. Politically, it seems important to recognize
that valuable reformscan havesmallimpacts until other complementary reforms
are undertaken, at least unless the sequence of reforms is chosen quite carefully.
Of course, it should also be recognized that some reforms could affect dis-
tortions in multiple sectors simultaneously. One example of this is considered
next.
7.1. Multinationals and Trade
Multinational ﬁrms and international trade may help to solve these problems
if they are allowed to operate. For example, multinationals may bring with them
knowledge of how to produce, access to transportation and foreign markets,
and the appropriate capital equipment. Indeed many of the examples we know
of where multinationals produce successfully in poor countries effectively give
the multinational control on as many dimensions as possible: consider the
maquiladoras of Mexico and the special economic zones in China and India.
Countries may specialize in goods they can produce with high productivity and,
to the extent possible, import the goods and services that suffer most from weak
links.11
On the other hand, domestic weak links may still be a problem. A lack of
contract enforcement may make intermediate inputs hard to obtain. Knowledge
of which intermediate goods to buy and how to best use them in production
may be missing. Weak property rights may lead to expropriation. Inadequate
energy supplies and local transportation networks may reduce productivity. The
right goods must be imported, and these goods must be distributed using local
resources and nontradable inputs, as in Burstein, Neves and Rebelo (2003).
Incorporating international trade into this framework is a natural direction for
future research. Of course, to the extent that these channels are shut down in the
11Nunn (2007) provides evidence along these lines, suggesting that countries that are able to
enforce contracts successfully specialize in goods where contract enforcement is critical. See
also Grossman and Maggi (2000) and Waugh (2007).40 CHARLES I. JONES
poorest countries of the world, the closed economy benchmark considered here
illustrates the range of income differences that could exist. But the transition
dynamics that would result from opening up to trade or multinationals could be
different from the reform paths highlighted above.
8. CONCLUSION
In this theory of economic development, relatively small average differences
across countries translate into large differences in aggregate output per worker.
There are two reasons for this. First, forces of complementarity and substitution
lead extreme sectors — both the superstars and weak links — to play dispropor-
tionate roles. Because of misallocation, income differences between countries
can be driven by opposite extremes. Income in the rich countries may depend
primarily on superstars, while income in the poor countries may depend on the
weakest links.
The second ampliﬁcation force is even simpler and easier to quantify. The
presence of intermediate goods leads to a multiplier that depends on the share
of intermediate goods in gross output. Distortions to the transportation sector
reduce the output of many other sectors, including truck manufacturing and the
fuel sector. This in turn will reduce output in the transportation sector. This
vicious cycle is the source of the multiplier associated with intermediate goods.
An important channel for future research concerns the role of intermediate
goods. The present model simpliﬁes considerably by taking the intermediate
input to be units of the ﬁnal output good. The input-output matrix in this model
is very special. This is a good place to start. However, it is possible that the
rich input-output structure in modern economies delivers a multiplier smaller
than 1
1−σ because of “zeros” in the matrix. In work in progress, Jones (2007a)
explores this issue. The preliminary results are encouraging. For example, if
the share of intermediate goods in each sector is σ but the composition of this
share varies arbitrarily, the aggregate multiplier is still 1
1−σ. More generally, I
plan to use actual input-output tables for both OECD and developing countriesINTERMEDIATE GOODS, WEAK LINKS, AND SUPERSTARS 41
to compute the associated multipliers. I believe this will conﬁrm the central role
played by intermediate goods in amplifying distortions.
APPENDIX: PROOFS OF THE PROPOSITIONS
Proposition 1. the symmetric allocation, given capital:
Proof. Follows directly from the fact that Yi = Aim, where m =
(KαH1−α)1−σXσ is constant across activities.
Proposition 2. the competitive equilibrium, given capital:
Proof.
1. The ﬁrst order conditions from the Variety i Problem are
(1 − τi)piα(1 − σ)
Yi
Ki
= r + δ








Substituting these conditions back into the production function yields an equa-





where mc ≡ ((r + δ)αw1−α)1−σqσ is a key piece of the marginal cost and
ǫ ≡ (αα(1 − α)1−α)1−σ(1 − σ)1−σσσ.
2. Integrating the Variety i ﬁrst order conditions above gives
(r + δ)K = α(1 − σ)
 
(1 − τi)piYidi (A.2)
wH = (1 − α)(1 − σ)
 
(1 − τi)piYidi (A.3)
qX = σ
 
(1 − τi)piYidi (A.4)42 CHARLES I. JONES






piYidi = Y + qX.
Deﬁne τ ≡ T
Y +qX to be tax revenues as a share of gross output. Then
 
(1 − τi)piYidi = (1 − τ)(Y + qX).
Substituting this expression into (A.2), (A.3), and (A.4) gives
(r + δ)K = α(1 − σ)
1 − τ
1 − σ(1 − τ)
Y (A.5)
wH = (1 − α)(1 − σ)
1 − τ




1 − σ(1 − τ)
Y. (A.7)
These expressions allow us to solve for mc (see the deﬁnition under (A.1)) as
mc =
1 − τ




3. Next, consider the ﬁrst-order conditions from the Final Good and Interme-
diate Good Problems. For each of these problems, take the ﬁrst order condition





















Now substitute (A.1) into (A.9) to get
mc = ǫQθ (A.11)
where
Qθ ≡
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where Qρ is deﬁned analogously to Qθ. Combining (A.8), (A.11), (A.7), and
(A.13) yields the main result in the proposition.
4. Finally, we need to solve for τ. From the ﬁrst-order conditions for the
Final Goods Problem and the Intermediate Goods Problem we get
piYi = pici + pizi = p
− θ
1−θ




Multiplying this expression by τi, integrating, and then using (A.1), (A.11), and
(A.13) leads to the solution for τ given implicitly in footnote 8.
Proposition 3. the competitive equilibrium in steady state:
Proof. Straightforward using (A.5) and the Euler equation from the House-
hold Problem.
Proposition 4. symmetric tax wedges:
Proof. Straightforward evaluation given earlier results.
Proposition 5. random productivity and wedges:
Proof.
1. Deﬁne Q(η) ≡
  
(Ai(1 − τi))ηdi
 1/η. Deﬁne mi ≡ η(ai + ωi). Then























which is term B of the proposition.44 CHARLES I. JONES
2. To get term A, we need to solve for τ. From footnote 8, one can obtain
1 − τ =
1 − Tθ
1 − σ(Tθ − Tρ)
.
Evaluating the integrals in Tθ and Tρ as above gives











and Tρ is the analogous expression. These expressions deliver term A.
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